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Universities are a key source of the new
scientific knowledge that drives long-run
economic growth. But what are the incentives
for scientists to generate commercially valuable
inventions and for university managers to
license such technologies to the private sector?
Research by Mark Schankerman and
colleagues investigates.
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P
erhaps the greatest long-
term productivity advances
come through
breakthroughs in basic
knowledge – and a
substantial proportion of the research and
development (R&D) that creates new
knowledge and leads to increased
productivity is done in universities.
University research not only raises the
productivity of private sector R&D (through
‘knowledge spillovers’) and encourages
more of it to be done; it also leads to
inventions that can be commercialised,
either through licensing to private firms or
via the formation of new start-up
companies.
Such ‘technology transfer’ by
universities has grown dramatically in the
past two decades, particularly in the United
States. Between 1991 and 2004, the
number of US university patent
applications rose from 1,584 to 10,517,
and licensing income increased from $218
million to $1.4 billion (which is 6% of
federal R&D financing for universities).
European and Asian universities are less
involved in this form of technology transfer
but are rapidly expanding their activities. 
The rapid growth of technology
transfer in the United States is in part due
to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. This piece of
legislation not only gave universities the
right to patent new discoveries but also
mandated them to license inventions made
with federally sponsored research to the
private sector. Now, nearly all US research
universities have a technology licensing
office and explicit intellectual property
policies and royalty-sharing arrangements
for their scientists.
Analysing technology
transfer
In essence, technology transfer involves
two distinct activities: innovation by
university scientists and commercialisation
by the university’s technology licensing
office (see Figure 1). In the first stage,
scientists produce both publications and
inventions. The mix of these two may be
influenced by the incentive of money, Im
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either for themselves directly or as
enhanced funding for their research
laboratories. Other incentives – such as
promotion and tenure rules, and intrinsic
motivation to do basic and applied
research – are also likely to play a role. 
The second stage is the
commercialisation of inventions by the
technology licensing office, which decides
whether to patent and license inventions,
identifies licensees and structures
contracts. The effectiveness of the
technology licensing office is likely to be
influenced by the university's objectives,
government constraints on licensing and
incentives given to its managers.
Our research programme is studying
the role of incentives and other
institutional features that can make the
process of technology transfer more
effective. Given the importance of
research for long-term growth, it is critical
to understand what drives scientific
endeavour and technology licensing
activity.
Is research a purely intellectual pursuit
driven by intrinsic motivation, or do
economic incentives play a role in the way
that scientists structure their work? What
are the most appropriate incentives for
managers in technology licensing offices?
And how is technology transfer
performance influenced by whether a
university is private or public (and hence
constrained by government objectives) and
the degree to which it chooses, or is
obliged, to promote local and regional
development? Our research programme
explores all of these questions.
Royalty incentives for
scientists 
In a study with Saul Lach, I use US data (as
similar data are not yet available in
Europe) to examine how the share of
licensing royalties from university
inventions received by academic inventors
(their ‘cash flow rights’) affects the
number and licensing value of inventions
in universities.
Our central finding is that incentives
are effective: universities that give greater
royalty incentives do much better in terms
of licensing income from technology
transfer. This works both by inducing
greater effort by researchers and through
‘sorting’ of the most productive and
entrepreneurial scientists into high-royalty
universities. We also find that royalty
incentives have a much larger impact in
private universities than in public ones,
and technology licensing activity is more
commercially effective in the former.
In the United States, universities
usually claim exclusive ownership (‘control
rights’) over inventions made by their
scientists. But the cash flow rights from
licensing inventions are typically shared
between the inventor and various parts of
the university according to specified
royalty-sharing schedules. There is
substantial variation in these arrangements
across US research universities, which
makes it possible to estimate their effect
on inventive output.
Our study focuses on two outcomes –
licensing income and the number of
inventions disclosed by faculty scientists to
technology licensing offices – using data
from the Association of University
Technology Managers, combined with
information on the distribution of royalty
shares for 102 US universities during the
period 1991-99.
The novel aspect of the data is the
information on the distribution of licensing
income between the university and the
inventor(s). The inventor retains a given
percentage of net licensing income and
the rest is allocated to the inventor's
laboratory, department and college and to
the university. Our criterion for identifying
the inventor’s share is that the inventor
must gain either cash flow rights or must
have direct control rights over the income
(for example, lab research money).
In about half the universities, these
royalty shares vary with the level of
licensing income generated by an invention
(‘non-linear royalty schedules’). The
average inventor's share is 41% among
the 58 universities using linear royalty
schedules, but there is substantial variation:
the minimum inventor royalty share is 25%
and the maximum 65%. The royalty shares
in the 44 universities with non-linear
schedules display even larger variability: the
average royalty share is 51%, but the
minimum is 20% and the maximum 97%.
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Another striking feature is that in
every university, inventor royalty shares are
either constant or decline with the level of
licensing income per invention. On
average, they start at 54% and decline to
30% for inventions generating over 
$1 million. Royalty shares are also
unrelated to various characteristics of the
universities, such as faculty size, academic
quality and the number of technology
licensing office professionals per faculty. 
Among the more detailed findings of
our research:
■ Academic research and inventive activity
in universities respond to variations in
inventors' royalty shares. Controlling for
a variety of factors – including university
size, quality and R&D funding –
universities with higher royalty shares
generate higher levels of licensing
income. This finding is important
because it implies that the design of
intellectual property rights and other
forms of incentives in academic
institutions can have real effects.
■ Inventors respond both to cash royalty
share and to royalties used to support
their research labs (when the scientists
have direct control over their use). Thus,
both high-powered monetary incentives
and intrinsic motivation seem to play a
role. This is relevant to the design of
university royalty-sharing arrangements.
For example, non-science faculty may
view generous payments to support
research labs as less objectionable than
direct cash payments to the scientists.
■ The incentive effects of royalty-sharing
work both by inducing greater effort by
scientists and through sorting of
scientists across universities so that the
most productive and entrepreneurial
scientists tend to work in higher royalty
universities.
■ The response to incentives is much
larger in private universities than in
public ones. If universities do not expect
a strategic reaction from their
competitors, the research indicates that
in most private universities, and in about
half the public ones, the incentive effect
is strong enough to produce a ‘Laffer
effect’, where raising the inventor's
royalty share actually increases the
license revenue retained by the university
(net of payments to inventors).
■ But when universities expect competing
universities to match changes in their
royalty share, the benefits to the
universities of raising inventors’ royalty
shares will be smaller. Thus, high-
powered, invention-based incentives are
important, but so too is the strategic
behaviour among universities in setting
these incentives. 
■ Technology licensing offices are more
productive in private universities,
suggesting that private institutions have
more effective, commercially-oriented
technology transfer activity.
Incentives for technology
licensing offices
Why might university ownership affect
technology transfer performance? In a
study with Sharon Belenzon, I combine
evidence from surveys of US universities’
technology licensing offices with panel
data on licensing performance to address
this question.
Whereas previous research has shown
that technology transfer performance is
influenced by university characteristics and
other factors, including university
ownership (public versus private),
academic quality, local (high-tech) demand
conditions and licensing contract design,
our study focuses more on the `black box'
of productivity within the technology
licensing office. We examine three key
determinants of technology licensing
productivity – performance pay; local
development objectives; and government
constraints on licensing activity –
combining new survey data with panel
data from public sources on 86 US
universities for the period 1995-99.
The survey data show that universities’
two main objectives are generating
licensing income and promoting local and
regional development, the latter goal
being more prominent in public
universities. Institutions that view local
economic development as one of their
primary functions might perform
differently from those that exclusively
pursue income maximisation.
Public universities are also more
affected by the imposition by state
governments of a variety of constraints –
both statutory restrictions and informal
political pressure – on their licensing
activity. Our study quantifies the impact of
incentives and measures the implicit cost
of these constraints and of concentrating
on local development objectives by
estimating forgone licensing income.
We find that technology licensing
offices in private universities are much
more likely to adopt incentive pay for
their staff than those in public
institutions. But ownership does not
affect the licensing performance of the
technology licensing office once the use
of incentive pay is controlled for. From a
policy perspective, this means that it
might be possible to get ‘private
performance’ from public institutions if
the right incentives are introduced.
These incentives certainly matter: we
find that technology transfer performance
is strongly influenced by whether a
technology licensing office uses
performance-based pay for their staff.
We also find that technology transfer
performance is affected by the extent to
which there is a preference for developing
licensing activity locally rather than more
widely, and by formal and informal
constraints imposed by government.
Universities with a stronger local
development focus earn far less licensing
income from a given pool of inventions.
This raises important policy questions
about the right balance between income
maximisation and local development focus
in technology licensing activity. 
Among the more detailed findings of
our research:
■ Compared with technology licensing
offices in public universities, those in
private universities are significantly more
likely to use performance-based pay.
Among the private universities surveyed,
79% use some form of incentive pay as
compared with only half of the public
universities.
■ Performance pay has strong incentive
The incentive
effect of
royalty-
sharing for
scientists is
much larger
in private
universities
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This article draws on research reported in
‘Incentives and Invention in Universities’ 
by Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 729
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0729.pdf) and ‘The Impact of Private
Ownership, Incentives and Local
Development Objectives on University
Technology Transfer Performance’ by Sharon
Belenzon and Mark Schankerman, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 779 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp0779.pdf).
Mark Schankerman is professor of
economics at LSE and director of CEP’s
research programme on productivity and
innovation. Saul Lach is professor of
economics at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. Sharon Belenzon, a CEP research
associate, is a postdoctoral research fellow at
Nuffield College, Oxford.
effects. Universities that use bonus pay
generate, on average, about 30-40%
more income per license, after
controlling for other factors.
■ While private ownership has a large,
positive effect on the adoption of
incentive pay, ownership has no
independent effect on licensing
performance, once we have controlled
for whether the university has adopted
incentive pay.
■ Private universities are much less
constrained in their freedom of
operation by state laws and regulations,
and are more likely to be focused on
generating licensing income compared
with more ‘social’ objectives such as
promoting local and regional
development. 
■ Local and regional development
objectives are ‘costly' in terms of
forgone license income. Universities
with strong objectives of this kind
generate, on average, about 30% less
income per license, after controlling for
other factors. State government
constraints also reduce license income.
The finding that local development
objectives are costly in terms of the
forgone license income raises an
important policy question. There are two
economic arguments for having a
preference for local licensing. First, pure
knowledge spillovers have a tendency to
be geographically localised. Second, the
new economic geography literature
emphasises that growth can be stimulated
by agglomeration effects working through
various supply and demand linkages.
But by showing that there is an
opportunity cost of promoting local
development in this way, our research
highlights the importance of comparing
this approach with an alternative policy of
maximising income from university
inventions (with no preference for local
development) and using the additional
license income generated to finance local
economic development in other ways – for
example, through lower business taxes or
direct subsidy programmes.
Conclusions
Many countries, in Europe and beyond,
are increasingly concerned about how to
promote more effective technology
transfer and other forms of research
collaboration between universities (and
other public research organisations) and
the private sector. Clear ownership rights,
incentives and a clear definition of the
objectives of technology transfer are key
elements of that process.
Our research makes a contribution to
that public debate by showing that the
benefits to universities are strongly
affected by how incentives are set and by
identifying characteristics of technology
licensing offices that influence the
effectiveness of royalty incentives.
One caveat applies to all this work.
Our findings contribute to the policy
debate about the effectiveness of
university licensing activity, but they are
not a cost-benefit analysis of the
'commercialisation' of universities. Many
scholars have expressed concerns about
the potential costs of these developments,
including the threat to established norms
of ‘open science’ and the potential
redirection of research away from
fundamental science. While there is only
limited evidence of such costs thus far,
continuing vigilance is needed to ensure
that they do not get out of hand.
Important challenges for research and
policy remain:
■ How should the ‘market for technology
licensing’ best be structured, and what
role, if any, should government have in
that process?
■ Should universities have monopoly
control over the inventions of their
scientists, as they currently do, or
should the scientists be free to market
their inventions through other
channels?
■ Should the use of market-based patent
and licensing intermediaries be allowed
(while preserving the sharing of cash
flow rights between the scientist and
the university)? 
■ How much geographic specialisation
should there be (for example, should
universities join into regional technology
transfer offices, as in some countries
like Germany?) and should such offices
specialise in particular scientific
disciplines?
■ In short, how should the market in
technology transfer be structured to
exploit most effectively the economies
of scale and informational advantages
in these activities? 
Universities with a stronger
local development focus earn
much less licensing income
Royalty incentives for
scientists need to be
combined with
performance incentives
within technology
licensing offices
